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The 103rd, 104th and 105th Congresses considered whether to
require risk analysis of environmental regulatory proposals by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other agencies. The
House and Senate each approved at least one such proposal (see below).
However, no Congress has enacted a requirement for risk analysis that
would change the way all environmental, or health and safety,
regulations are developed. It is not clear whether any comprehensive
requirement for risk analysis of environmental regulations will be
considered by the 106th Congress. Some believe that recent proposals
lack most of the provisions that historically have been stumbling blocks
to passage, and they see a gathering momentum for a legislative
mandate. While others percieve the waning of congressional interest.
At some point, however, Congress is expected to again debate an
overarching mandate for risk analysis of environmental regulations.
Many believe that environmental programs could be more efficient,
flexible, and less costly to the regulated community, if the EPA
considered the results of risk analysis. Others disagree, arguing that
such analyses use scarce agency resources, delay rulemaking, and force
decisions to conform to the analytic results, regardless of the quality of
underlying data and models.
This report describes and compares selected provisions related to
risk analysis in key legislative proposals introduced from the 103rd
through the 105th Congresses, including:
* The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not necessarily
represent those of the Congressional Research Service.
** Dr. Schierow is a Specialist in Environmental and Natural Resources Division of
the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. She received her B.S.
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* the Johnston amendments to S. 171, a bill to confer
cabinet-level status on the EPA, and to S. 2019, a bill to
reauthorize the Safe Drinking Water Act, both as passed
by the Senate in the 103rd Congress;
* S. 343, as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary,
in the 104th Congress;
* Divisions C and D of H.R. 9, as passed by the House, in
the 104th Congress;
• S. 981, as reported by the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, in the 105th Congress; and
" S. 1728, as introduced, in the 105th Congress.
The comparison emphasizes differences among provisions related to
risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis and mechanisms such as judicial
review or peer review that make agencies more accountable for the
quality of such analyses.
This report also focuses on the general provisions of highlighted
sections oflarge and complex bills; specific provisions that modify the
general requirements of the highlighted sections may be omitted.
Key Legislative Proposals
103rd Congress
More than a dozen bills and amendments on environmental risk
analysis were introduced in the 103rd Congress. One, H.R. 4217, was
enacted, but it applied only to the Department of Agriculture. Nine
other bills were passed by one chamber or reported by the committees
of jurisdiction.
Arguably, the most influential risk proposals in the 103rd Congress
were two amendments offered by Senator J. Bennett Johnston. The
original "Johnston amendment" was the first risk legislation debated on
the Senate floor, and it was adopted on April 29, 1993, by a vote of 95
to 3. The amendment was incorporated as § 123 in S. 171, a bill to raise
the EPA to department (cabinet) status. In the House, however, a
proposal to similarly amend a bill to elevate the EPA to the cabinet
(H.R. 3425) proved unsuccessful. The rule for consideration of the
reported House bill was defeated on the floor, reportedly in part
because the rule would have prevented introduction of non-germane
amendments, such as one on risk and cost-benefit analysis.
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During the second session of the 103rd Congress, Senator Johnston
addressed some of the key concerns of members when he introduced a
revised version of his amendment. It was adopted by the Senate during
the May 18, 1994 floor debate on Senate-passed S. 2019, a bill to
amend and reauthorize the Safe Drinking Water Act. The amendment
became Section 18 of the Senate-passed bill. Section 15, S. 2019, as
passed by the Senate, also included a revised version of a bill originally
introduced by Senator Moynihan (S. 110) that would have required the
EPA to rank pollution sources based on risk. These bills did not receive
House action.
104th Congress
Three risk-related bills were reported to the Senate in the 104th
Congress (S. 291, S. 333, and S. 343). In June, 1995, the three were
merged and presented on the Senate floor by Senator Dole as a
substitute amendment for S. 343, as reported by the Committee on
Judiciary. After two weeks of debate and three failed votes to invoke
closure, the Senate turned to other issues. The reported bill, also known
as the Dole bill, is summarized in this report.
The House Republican Contract with America promised that
within the first 100 days of the 104th Congress, risk legislation would
be introduced, debated, and voted upon in the House. Title III of the
"Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995" (JCWEA), one of
the draft bills distributed with the House Republican contract,
appeared to integrate several of the proposals related to risk analysis
involved in the 103rd Congress; including a slightly modified version
of the original Johnston amendment with coverage expanding beyond
the EPA to include all Federal agencies that promulgate regulations
concerning human health and safety or the environment. The House
amended and passed these provisions in H.R. 9 on March 3, 1995.
H.R. 9, as passed by the House, contained four divisions, A-D.
Each contained the text of a bill that had passed the House prior to
consideration of H.R. 9. Division C and Division D had provisions
related to risk analysis. Division C contained the text of H.R. 926, the
Regulatory Reform and Relief Act, while Division D had the text of
H.R. 1022, the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995. The
Senate did not act on H.R. 9.
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Although the 104th Congress adjourned without enacting
comprehensive requirements for risk analysis, Congress did enact risk-
based provisions that was included in major legislation addressing
drinldng water (P.L. 104-182) and food safety (P.L. 104-170). The
provisions also incorporated requirements for economic analysis, which
for environmental regulations requires some analysis of risks as a basis
for calculating risk reduction benefits (P.L. 104-4; P.L. 104-121, Title
II). None of these mandates for risk analysis is compared in this report.
105th Congress
The 105th Congress considered various proposals that would have
mandated analysis of environmental risks, but adjourned without
approving any comprehensive regulatory reform legislation or other
provisions that would have increased use of risk analysis by the EPA
The most comprehensive, S. 981, as reported by the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, contained bipartisan support (S. Rept. 105-
188), but also faced significant opposition. The Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs reported S. 981, the Regulatory Improvement
Act of 1998, as amended, on May 11, 1998, but the bill received no
floor action. The Majority Leader introduced a risk-only version, S.
1728, that would have applied only to proposed and final regulations to
protect health, safety, or the environment with a potential annual cost
to the economy of $100 million or more.
Comparison of Selected Provisions
Applicability
In general, bills mandating risk analysis have become more complex
and detailed since 1993. From the 103rd to the 104th Congress,
proposed mandates for federal risk analysis have broadened to
encompass more agencies. The Johnston amendments would have
required risk analysis only by the EPA, while proposals in the 104th
Congress would have targeted all agencies, including independents
that, unlike others, have never been required by executive order to
perform risk analysis or economic analysis for proposed or final rules. 1
1 President Reagan issued the first explicit mandate for regulatory risk analysis in
January 1985. For more information about the requirements of executive orders, see
Linda-Jo Schierow, Senator Johnston's Proposals for Regulatory Reform: New Cost-
Benefit Risk Analysis Requirements for EPA, 6 Risk 1 (1995).
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It is not clear whether bills in the 105th Congress would have
required more or fewer risk analyses and economic analyses by
individual agencies than those in the 104th. The Johnston amendment
to S. 171 would have applied only to final rules that related to human
health and safety or the environment, while later legislation would have
mandated analysis of proposed as well as final rules, and (with the
exception of S. 1728 in the 105th Congress) would have covered rules
for any regulatory purpose.2
Moreover, although the proposed bills generally would have
affected all substantive rulemaking (that is, rule development for all
rules covered by the notice and comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act), some proposals in the 104th and 105th
Congresses would have affected additional activities. For example,
under S. 343, risk analyses unconnected with rulemaking would have
been affected and interpretive rules or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice, if they had altered or created rights or
obligations of persons. Similarly, S. 981 would have affected risk
characterizations in risk assessment documents and agency decisions, as
well as regulatory proposals. S. 1728 would have required analyses if a
significant substitution risk resulted from promulgation of a rule.
Proposals in the 104th and 105th Congresses would have applied
only to rules with a "major" or "significant" impact on the economy,
health, the environment or public policy. In contrast, the Johnston
amendment to S. 171 in the 103rd Congress applied regardless of the
rule significance. Under the Johnston amendment to Senate-passed S.
2019, analysis would be required only for rules annually costing $100
million or more. In the 104th Congress, S. 343 and H.R. 9 Division C
would have applied to rules with an estimated annual cost of $50
million or more, while H.R. 9 Division D would have affected rules
with a probable cost of $25 million or more.3 In the 105th Congress,
both S. 981, as reported, and S. 1728, as introduced, would have
effected rules annually costing $100 million or more.
2 S.1728, like the Johnston amendment to S.171 in the 103rd Congress, targets
only rules for which the primary purpose is to address health, safety, or environmental
risks.
3 The language used to define a "major rule" is precise and meaningful. Note that
the number of rules with an "effect on the national economy" of a certain monetary
value is likely to be much greater than the number of rules with a "cost" of equal value.
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Definitions of "major rules" and "significant risk assessments" also
varied in the amount of discretion they would have provided to the
President's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to designate
rules as major or non-major. Rules likely to result in major increases in
costs, prices or significant adverse effects on economic activity could
have been designated as major under any of the legislative proposals in
the 104th and 105th Congresses. The Senate bills during this period
also would have authorized designation of a rule as major if it had
effects on health, safety, or the environment. S. 981 would have given
the OMB authority to require a risk analysis in order to comply with
proposed requirements.
All of the proposed mandates, except the Johnston amendments,
authorized exemptions for certain types of rules. For example, S. 343,
H.R. 9 Divisions C and D, S. 981, and S. 1728 would have applied to
emergencies, while S. 343, H.R. 9 Division D, and S. 981 would have
exempted from risk analysis, requirement rules approving product
labels (e.g., for pharmaceutical drugs). S. 171 and S. 2019 would have
required the EPA to perform the analyses or to report the reasons for
noncompliance in the Federal Register and to Congress.
Analytic Requirements
All of the proposals would have required agencies to analyze risks
when developing rules; generally before the risk is addressed by the
regulation, relative to other risks that could be addressed, and after a
risk is managed under the rule to estimate the incremental amount of
risk reduction that might be achieved. For example, the Johnston
amendment to S. 171 would have demanded analyses of:
* risks to individuals addressed by the regulation;
* the health and environmental effects of the regulation;
and
* addressed risks compared to other risks.
S. 2019 added a requirement to analyze risks of "significant
subpopulations disproportionately exposed or particularly sensitive." It
also explicitly required qualitative, as well as quantitative, analysis of
risks.
H.R. 9 and S. 343, as reported in the 104th Congress, would have
included requirements to analyze: (1) uncertainties; (2) assumptions; (3)
substitution risks (risks resulting from regulation); (4) the distribution
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of risk in a population (that is, who is at risk); and (5) the likelihood
that exposure to risks would occur. All these analytic requirements were
included in S. 981 (105th Congress).
Beginning in the 104th Congress, proposals specified certain
principles of risk analysis that covered agency analyses and presentations
of results requiring conformity. The bills proposed various means of
estimating and then expressing risk: in the 104th Congress, agencies
would have been directed to use "plausible" or "unbiased" models and
to present a "best estimate"; S. 981 would have mandated a "weight of
scientific evidence" approach, and expression of a central and high end
risk estimate; and S. 1728 would have required public input and
statement of the "most plausible" risk estimates.
Analysis of costs and benefits would have been mandated by all
highlighted bills (except that introduced by Senator Lott late in the
105th Congress), but the bills differed on how agencies would relate
costs and benefits.4 Both versions of the Johnston amendments (103rd)
and S. 343 (104th) would have required consideration of whether the
benefits would justify the costs. S. 343 and S. 981 (105th) would have
mandated analysis of net benefits explicitly. S. 2019 and S. 981 in the
105th Congress also would have required a cost-effectiveness analysis.
More elements of economic analysis were added to bills in the
104th Congress. Both S. 343 and H.R. 9 would have required analysis
of the distribution of costs and benefits, incremental costs and benefits,
effects on small businesses and the cumulative cost to the regulated
community - and comparing all these measures for all specified
alternatives to the proposed or final rule. S. 343, but not H.R. 9, would
have directed EPA to assess net benefits, net costs and net effects on
small businesses. H.R. 9 would have mandated analysis of whether
benefits would exceed costs.
S. 981, in the 105th Congress, would have added requirements to
analyze the feasibility of using market-based mechanisms, the quality of
information, and the flexibility provided to local and state governments
and the regulated community. S. 981, like S. 343 before it, specified
certain principles of economic analysis.
4 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (P.L. 104-4), enacted by the 104th
Congress, requires federal agencies to analyze costs and benefits of all proposed and
final rules with an expected cost of $100 million or more.
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Regulatory Decision Criteria
Except for S. 1728 (105th Congress), all of the highlighted bills
would have established criteria for evaluating and choosing among
regulatory options, based on analytic results. Excluding S. 1728, the
bills would have established economic criteria that are summarized in
the table below. Both Johnston amendments, S. 343, and S. 981 stated
that benefits should justify costs. The Johnston amendment to S. 2019
also would have required a rule to be most cost-effective. S. 343 would
have required a rule to be most cost-effective or least-cost. S. 981 would
have promoted selection of the rule that was most cost-effective or that
provided the greatest net benefits. Finally, H.R. 9 would have
mandated rules that were most cost-effective or provided more
flexibility, and that had incremental benefits likely to justify and be
reasonably related to the incremental costs.5
Table 1
Decision Criteria Employed by Key Proposals in the 103rd - 105th Congresses
Decision Criteria S. 171 S. 2019 S. 343 H.R. 9 S. 981 S. 1728
Benefits justify costs X X X X
Most cost-effective X X X X
Least cost X




Effect on Existing Law
Arguably, the highlighted bills of the 103rd and 105th Congresses
would not have superseded other provisions of federal law, such as the
Clean Air Act or the Safe Drinking Water Act, with regard to how the
EPA should weigh costs and risks in developing regulations. Some
argued that the Congresses would not have authorized the EPA to
employ risk-based or economic criteria when implementing other
statutes either Nevertheless, this apparent neutrality with respect to
existing law was made more explicit, as time passed; the amendment to
S. 2019 was more explicit than that to S. 171, and in the 105th
Congress, S. 981 provided greater assurance that its requirements
5 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, supra, requires federal agencies to
promulgate the alternative that is least costly, most effective, or least burdensome, or
to explain why such an alternative was not adopted.
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would apply only to the extent that they were not inconsistent with
existing statutes. According to some observers, however, the neutrality
of proposed requirements relative to existing statutory requirements
never was stated clearly. S. 1728 would not have established decision
criteria, so its analytic requirements apparently would not have
conflicted with existing legal requirements.
In contrast, S. 343 explicitly would have prohibited promulgation
of a rule unless decision criteria were met (that is, benefits justified
costs, and the rule was the most cost-effective or least-cost alternative).
Similarly, H.R. 9 Division D would have superseded provisions of
existing laws and prohibited promulgation of a major rule, unless
incremental benefits were likely to justify and be reasonably related to
the incremental costs, and alternatives were either less cost-effective or
provided less flexibility to regulated entities or local or state
governments.
Coordination and Quality Control
Executive Oversight. The OMB has been overseeing cost-benefit
analyses of regulations under the authority of executive orders since
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12291 in 1981. In contrast,
the OMB has no clear authority to oversee risk analyses, except to the
extent that they underlie benefit analyses for regulations under review.
Three of the bills (S. 343, H.R. 9, and S. 981) would have
authorized executive branch oversight of agencies' regulatory analyses
and mandated issuance of guidance for the conduct of economic and
risk analyses. Two (H.R. 9 and S. 981) would have assigned these tasks
to the OMB. Only economic analyses of regulations would have been
reviewed under H.R. 9, but the OMB would have been required to
approve or comment on a final cost-benefit analysis prior to
promulgation of a major rule. S. 981 would have authorized the OMB
to oversee risk assessments and peer review, as well as economic
analyses. H.R. 9 would have required the OMB to evaluate federal
agencies' rulemaking procedures, while S. 981 would have directed the
OMB to evaluate agencies' cost-benefit and risk analyses periodically.
As a check on the new statutory authority of the OMB to supervise
regulatory proposals, S. 981 and H.R. 9 would have limited the time
for the OMB review to 90 days, while S. 343 permitted only 30 days.
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However, all three bills would have allowed the period to be extended.
In addition, S. 981 would have required public disclosure of any
changes to regulatory proposals that resulted from the review, and a
written record of relevant contacts the OMB had with the regulatory
agency and persons outside the executive branch. H.R. 9 also required a
written record of relevant contacts made with persons outside the
agency. Neither the Johnston amendments in the 103rd Congress nor
S. 1728 in the 105th had any provision regarding oversight by the
executive branch of government.
Peer Review. Peer review was another mechanism proposed to
ensure the quality of agencies' analytic work and the scientific
soundness of decisions. S. 343 in the 104th Congress, relied most
heavily on peer review, as it would have required peer review of
agencies' analyses for major new rules, reviews of analyses for existing
rules, risk estimates supporting database entries, and clean-up plans for
hazardous waste sites. Also in the 104th Congress, H.R. 9 would have
required peer review of analyses for major rules worth at least $100
million and of other analyses designated by the OMB. In the 105th
Congress, S. 981 would have required peer review only for major rules.
Neither the Johnston amendments in the 103rd Congress nor S. 1728
in the 105th had any provision regarding peer review.
Other Provisions
Deadlines. Statutory and judicial deadlines for promulgation of
rules were treated in various ways by the bills of interest. The original
Johnston amendment was silent on the subject of deadlines. Risk
analysis requirements imposed by the Johnston amendment to S. 2019
and H.R. 9 would have been waived or deferred when there was a
conflicting statutory or judicial deadline. In contrast, S. 343, S. 981,
and S. 1728 would have suspended deadlines to allow compliance with
requirements for regulatory analysis.
Review of Rules. Only S. 343, H.R. 9, and S. 981 would have
required agencies to review existing major rules. Under S. 343, all
existing rules would have terminated in seven years unless they were
reviewed by the administering agency.
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Citizen Petitions. Bills in the 104th Congress would have
authorized citizen petitions for judicial review of agency compliance
with analytic requirements. In addition, S. 343 would have provided
broad authority for citizen petitions to force agencies to examine and
redesign rules so that they conformed to decision criteria. Bills in the
103rd and 105th Congresses did not provide for citizen petitions.
Judicial Review. Proposals differed widely in their treatment of
judicial review. The Johnston amendments in the 103rd Congress
would not have subjected either the compliance of agencies with
analytic requirements or its analyses to judicial review.
In the 104th Congress, S. 343, as reported, would have subjected all
agency decisions regarding rules, orders, petitions, licenses, sanctions, or
relief to judicial review, and it would have established a new set of
standards for judicial review, which includes a "substantial support in
the rulemaking file for the factual basis of agency actions." H.R. 9
Division D would have directed courts to consider agency actions
unlawful solely on the basis of a significant risk characterization or risk
analysis in the rulemaking record that did not substantially comply
with the proposed requirements.
In the 105th Congress, S. 981, as reported, would have permitted
review of agency compliance with analytic requirements only in
connection with review of a final agency action. S. 1728 also would have
subjected agency decisions about which rules are major, and agency risk
analyses in connection with review of a final agency action to judicial
review. Both bills in the 105th Congress would have only required that
the rule not be arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion (or
unsupported by substantial evidence where that standard otherwise was
provided by law), that the agency performed requisite analyses where
the designation of a rule not be "clearly and convincingly"
erroneous(under S. 1728).
Risk-Based Priorities. Several of the highlighted bills would have
promoted use of analytic results to prioritize regulatory efforts within
agencies: S. 343 would have required agencies to reflect risk-based
priorities in annual budget requests; H.R. 9 would have required that
relative risks and cost-effective risk reduction strategies be identified
within regulatory programs; and S. 981 would have required agencies to
inform annual budgets, and strategic and performance plans with the
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results of a study by a scientific institution of relative risks and
strategies for reducing them. S. 1728 in the 105th Congress had no
comparable provision and the Johnston amendments in the 103rd
Congress did not mention the setting of priorities.
6
Conclusion
A comparison of selected provisions of key legislative proposals
indicates that they broadened to encompass more federal agencies and
more kinds of agency activities. At the same time, more recent
proposals apply to a smaller fraction of "major" rules - often defined
as a rule with an annual cost of at least $100 million.
Most of the highlighted bills would have required economic
analysis, as well as risk analysis, and would have established economic
criteria for choosing among regulatory options. The preferred option
typically was the most cost-effective alternative and one that would
have produced benefits justifying costs. Such requirements became
more specific and increased in number between 1993 and 1998.
Proposals also became more complex as legislators tried to ensure
that unintended adverse consequences of an overarching mandate (e.g.,
delayed rulemaking in emergencies) would be avoided. Thus, each
Congress considered more exceptions, and caveats for analytic
requirements and decision rules. At the same time, perhaps to
compensate, proposals included more mechanisms to ensure the quality
of analyses. Compared to key proposals in the 104th Congress, the
more comprehensive proposal in the 105th Congress, S. 981, as
reported, would have reduced reliance on judicial review, while leaning
more heavily on peer review and executive oversight of analyses.
Executive branch reviews of agencies' rules generally would have been
limited to 90 days, and the substance of communications between the
OMB and the regulatory agency or between the OMB and anyone
outside of government about rules under review would have required
disclosure to the public.
6 However, S.2019 § 15 would have required a report of the relative risk of various
sources of pollution, and of the costs and benefits of risk reduction strategies.
